One client came to us after working with a previous advisor that cautioned her against opening in a new European market. This advisor insisted that signals showed this market simply wasn’t ready. This advisor was reputable, and so the advice could not simply be dismissed even though the founder and her team had a gut feeling that the market was exactly where they needed to be.

While we wouldn’t encourage any founder to make moves solely based on intuition, we do believe it’s a good starting point for exploration and further research. This was why she had reached out to the advisor in the first place, with the hopes of getting solid data that would back up her theory. Instead, the advisor came back with bad news and told the founder that they had analyzed the data, and their sophisticated tools were clearly indicating this was a bad move.

Just like we wouldn’t want a founder to make decisions based solely on feelings, we also would not advise one to disregard quantitative data. It’s incredibly important, and provides insights we might not already have otherwise. However, we also push hard for quantitative data to be paired with qualitative data before any decisions are made. The quantitative data showed red flags, yes, but when we reached out to our network and approached those who would actually be using the product, guess what? There was actually substantial interest by potential customers and we had three POCs lined up in the new market in a short window, which provided a clear signal that overrode what the quantitative data had indicated.

So what is the broader lesson here? Founders, and particularly first-time founders who may lack confidence or experience, may heavily rely on one credible voice and assume it represents the entire market. It’s an important sample for sure, but cannot be mistaken for the definitive answer. Even more experienced founders may make the same mistake in overreliance on one advisor’s opinion if they do not have the resources (time or money) to do further research.

It’s worth noting that even if the data itself is unbiased, the interpretation of it is still shaped by that advisor’s own thesis and instincts. That advisor might have seen those same signals indicate failure with another enterprise before. Maybe they fundamentally understand the niche, and how the data needs to be adjusted to account for variables that are specific to the use case. Or maybe the advisor is risk-averse, and simply finds it safer to conclude “no” rather than “possibly.”

Of course, seeking out additional information has to be strategic too. If one advisor cautions against opening a new market, but a different one suggests otherwise, well, then what? This isn’t meant to be a democratic system where the founder collects “votes” of yay or nay and simply goes with whichever side “wins.” Focus instead on giving an independent read of the data (quantitative and qualitative) that is being used to determine whether the market is worth exploring or not.

Also, remember which signals are the clearest of all and which should weigh most heavily when making a decision: what are the actual potential buyers saying? Are they interested? Will they put their money where their mouths are, so to speak, and commit to a POC or other trial? Those prospective customers are going to give founders the best sense of whether it’s worth the resources to forge a new path.

So here are three questions to ask before accepting a “no” as definitive:

Where is this “no” actually coming from?

Is this advisor tracking patterns across many similar deals they have already tracked, or is this outside of their comfort zone? Is this a vertical they are well-versed in? It’s key to distinguish between the advisor’s authority from a broad scope and whether it can accurately be applied to the use case.

What did the “no” specifically measure?

Quantitative tools are crucial but they are just that: tools! Great for measuring TAM, evaluating comparable products, searching trends, and so on. However, what they cannot do is take the crucial step of getting out into the market and actually talking to potential clients. So, figure out what the tools were actually measuring, and take steps to fill in information that the tools missed.

Lastly, did the “no” come from the market or just the expert?

In other words, don’t conflate the market with one person’s assessment, however credible they may be. So maybe the advisor says no, while the founder’s gut says yes, but what does the customer actually say?

A “no” is just as hypothetical as the founder’s instincts if it isn’t tested.

Data and instinct are both good, but not enough to drive decisions. If you’re trying to get that fundamental missing piece and don’t know where to start, let’s connect.